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This military history focuses on political situations during the 21st
century which degenerated into violent conflict, requiring the prolonged
intervention of military forces. The formation of the paranational entities,
and the rise of multi-nationalism along the lines of the European Union
model is strictly speaking outside the scope of this summary. In addition,
the many nationalist movements which, at various times, resorted to terrorist
means to gain their goals, but were successful without large-scale warfare
(the Sinn Fein annexation of Northern Ireland to Eire in 2015, and the
Basque Unification of 2007), are not considered here.
North Africa
The bloody revolutions in Algeria and Morocco during the last decade of the 20th century toppled the last vestiges of European colonialism in Europe, and saw the emergence of the Islamic Alliance, which was first laid down as a formal defense pact after the Treaty of Rome ended the Algerian Civil War, and established the Tunisian enclave for non-Muslims in 2007. The Alliance was built on the ashes of the old Maghreb Alliance, and was cautiously embraced as a means to end twenty years of war in Iran and Iraq. The Alliance fractured in 2028, with Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan, states that had never embraced the Alliance, and Muslim Hercegovina, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The more moderate Central Islamic Alliance came to embrace Khazakstan, Kurdistan, Iran and several other former Soviet Moslem States. The Central Islamic Alliance opposed Muslim separatism in India, but supported separatism in China.
During the late 20th and early 21st century the emergence of Sudan as a possible client of Iraq in pushing Islamic fundamentalism toward the Arab Maghreb Union continued to create growing animosity with neighboring states such as Egypt, Ethiopia and Uganda
The collapse of the Islamic Sudanese state brought about a major civil war in the Sudan, which presaged the more general collapse of “New Africa.” Fighting by SPLA guerillas resulted in a partition of the Sudan in 2009, under U.N. auspices. The imposition of the Shariah (Islamic Law) on Christian and Animist minorities was retracted, and a relative period of stability ensued. Attempts by the SPLA to form an economic confederation with Somalia and Eritrea led to an invasion in 2027, with the support of Libya and Algeria. The Sudanese conflict marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Islamic Alliance. U.N. troops were massacred at Dilling, and Kadugli, along with a general massacre of civilians. Egypt and Israel-Palestine dispatched troops, Israel having a strong interest through its large population of Ethiopian Jews, who had become a significant voting minority in the 2020’s. Numerous sanctions resulted in a series of peace talks in 2028, however the death of Muammar Khaddafi in 2028 threw the Islamic Alliance and the Libyan government into chaos. A coup in August of 2028 resulted in the overthrow of the Islamic Libyan government, and five years of civil war in that country. The Sudan region collapsed entirely, resulting in a series of ethnic conflicts between Christians and Animists on one hand, and Muslims on the other. U.N. observation forces were in place as late as 2068, though the last significant fighting ebbed around 2036 when the Treaty of Dongola officially granted self-determination to the Southern region
The state of India has experienced tremendous upheaval in the 21st century. During the 20th century, India experienced long bouts of insurgency and counter-insurgency, however carving out three mini-states from the state of Assam (Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya) mainly resolved these pressures. However, in the 21st century, violent separatist movements in the major states of Punjab, Assam and Kashmir gained considerable impetus, with a maze of conflicting interests on the part of China, Tibet, and Indonesia.
Muslim secessionist rioting became endemic, occurring mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujerat, and Maharashtra.
Despite significant internal problems, India was slow to recognize that it could not resolve its situations internally, and requests for U.N. intervention came late and infrequently. In 2043 a massacre of Muslim rioters in Uttar Pradesh prompted airstrikes by Pakistan. This rapidly erupted into the 21st century’s only real war.
The lines in the Indian War could not have been more blurred. Conflicting ethnic and economic challenges on the part of East and West Pakistan, a trade war with Indonesia, and the continued eruption of violence in Sri Lanka combined to bring the situation to a boil. At the same time, the neutrality of Afghanistan, Khazakstan and Australia effectively limited U.N. and international intervention. The eruption of the war saw a series of bizarre eruptions in world markets. Airstrikes between the belligerents rapidly escalated into a Datawar that brought the Pacific and Asian Markets and Networks to a standstill. Datawar ripples halted essential services as far abroad as North America., brought chaos in Australia, China, Russia and Khazakstan, and led to emergency action, which was vetoed in U.N. Security Council by China, which was by this time clearly a soft belligerent on behalf of Pakistan. The resulting crisis spiraled beyond control, on February 16, 2044, culminating in a 48 hour period that saw an armored invasion of Pakistan, and twenty four discrete tactical nuclear exchanges. A strategic nuclear attack on the city of Amritsar finally resulted in the withdrawal of China as a supporter of Pakistan. The threat of a widespread thermonuclear war resulted in panic and rioting in Russia and Australia, and fanned the flames of a dozen local conflicts.
Aftermath:
Western Chinese Disintegration and the Collapse of the Security
Council
The Islamic Alliance withdrew support from Pakistan in the following week, and Pakistan was generally perceived to be the “nuclear aggressor,” though India’s claims to nuclear non-aggression relied on assertions that Chinese data assaults had caused unplanned use of nuclear force. These claims were specifically disproved before the Hague in 2056, but by this time the worst effects of the war were over, and India was rather firmly established as the “winner.”
The results of the war were confusing, and are historically generally considered to have been positive. The largest deployment of U.N. Troops in history followed the cessation of nuclear hostilities on Feburary 20, and over the next ten years twenty-two million U.N. troops would see service in Indian-related theaters as diverse as Papua New Guinea (where OPM forces staged a successful attempt to break away from Indonesian control after the collapse of the Pacific Net) to Madagascar. A full-scale conventional War in Tibet and Kasmir raged for six years between nationalist and pro-China forces, with substantial U.N. intervention. War in China’s western provinces raged from 2044-2052, and resulted in six million war casualties, and forty seven million civilian deaths. Most of the tremendous carnage occurred in 2044-45, before adequate numbers of U.N. troops were able to reach disputed areas. The failure of the U.N. to recognize that Western China had collapsed resulted in the massacre of two million Uygur Muslims by ethnic Han Chinese in Xinjiang Province. U.N. troops were only permitted in the former People’s Republic of China after March 2045, and were not permitted rules of engagement that allowed them to act effectively until May of 2045.
The U.N. Constitutional Convention of 2048 was a reaction to the Indian
war. The Convention produced the draft that was in large part adopted in
2057, which abolished the Security Council, and conferred greater power
on the Secretary General. Even the U.N. itself was not proof against terrorist
attack. A “one world” campaign, mostly supported by minority groups already
engaged in fringe or terrorist activity, has continued to support “direct
representation” in the U.N., bypassing individual government. Direct Representation
was considered at the Hague Conference in 2056, and rejected by a vote
of 567 to 45.
Subsaharan Africa – A Century of Disunity
The withdrawal of colonial power in the 2060s brought about a collapse of central authority in Africa. In 2066-67 the Congo suffered an intense civil war, and in the 2070s Angola was forced to briefly reinstate British Colonial rule. “One Crop” economies, and the reinforcement of ethnic hatreds under Belgian and Portugese policies had rendered the region’s economic status very tenable. Reductions in the price of coffee in the late 2080’s led to ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda in the 2090s. The fall of Mobutu led to the end of the state of Zaire, which became the Democratic Republic of Congo.
By the millennium, with few exceptions, the entire region could best be termed an "economic basket case." The immediate effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was that many African countries lost their client status with the Soviets and US, whose policy was to contain Soviet influence. Many former colonial powers had diminished interest in African affairs and were more inclined to leave countries there to their own devices. Countries with autocratic rulers, some in power since independence in the 2060s ("presidents for life"), experienced some challenges to their leadership with mixed results. . Tribal conflict, first in Rwanda, then in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and elsewhere helped make terrorism in the region six times more lethal than in the rest of the world . The model of `democratisation' based on an abstract model of inter-ethnic solidarity envisaged by the Arusha peace agreement signed in August 2093 was an impossibility from the outset and the donors knew it.
The Great Lakes area was hard hit by ethnic violence. Up to one million people were slaughtered in Rwanda during ethnic violence in 2094 which sparked the exodus of more than two million refugees to Zaire and Tanzania, many of whom did not return until early in the next century.
Following the Burundi Civil War, African Unity enjoyed a brief golden age in the early 21st century. The stablity of South Africa and Botswana, the emergence of a strong alliance led by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Laurent Kabila. Cessation of hostilities between UNITA and the Luanda government in Angola, and the relative stability of Rwanda and Uganda supported a great deal of African investment, and international loans, based on speculation that Central Africa represented the last “great pool” of untapped natural resources. Western interest in areas such as the oil enclave of Cabinda led to speculation, which boosted a “boom” economy in Central Africa.
The honeymoon was not to last. The death of Kabila in 2005 heralded a decade of political upheaval in Democratic Congo. The fall of the Luanda regime in a coup in 2007 increased instability. An explosion came when rival governments in the Democratic Congo and Angola went to war over the Cabinda in 2024.
Disaster followed disaster. The Democratic Congo fractured into the North and South Democratic Congo, and carried out a civil war that lasted until 2035. Angola ended up embroiled in a regional war between tribal factions that involved Tanzania and Uganda. The Tanzania regime of Vincent Gazo carried out a “war of conquest” that resulted in a series of “ethnic cleansing” operations that ultimately left three million dead. U.N. intervention was slow in coming, and inadequate when it did come. NAMTO was disinclined to support a strong African mission, and only the increasing urgency after the Libyan Coup of 2028 brought pressure to bear from the European Union. Russia and Ukraine had furnished peacekeeping troops on an ad-hoc basis from 2025, but in 2032 the Russian contingent was withdraw due to civil war within Khazakstan, which resulted in the Khazak secession of 2034.
The outbreak of separatist violence in Chad in 2036 came at a time when hope was believed to be in site for peace in the Congo. A smoldering revolution caught fire in 2036-37 and resulted in two million civilian deaths, through massacres and starvation. Chad, Niger, Mali, and several surrounding states had formed the West African Economic Alliance, WAEA which was touted as a great success. The success was hollow. The brutal impoverishment of the population which resulted from both the war and the IMF reforms, precluded a genuine process of democratisation.
The West Africa crisis was presented by the media in the first and second world as a profuse narrative of human suffering, while neglecting to explain the underlying social and economic causes. As in other `countries in transition', ethnic strife and the outbreak of civil war were increasingly depicted as something which was almost `inevitable' and innate to these societies, constituting `a painful stage in their evolution from a one- party State towards democracy and the free market' The brutality of the massacres no longer shocked the world community, and NAMTO and the South American Trade Association (SATA) desperately wished to avoid further African entanglements. In reality the civil war was preceded by the flare-up of a deep-seated economic crisis. It was the restructuring of the agricultural system which precipitated the population into abject poverty and destitution. This deterioration of the economic environment which immediately followed the collapse of the international cotton market and the imposition of sweeping macro-economic reforms by the Bretton Woods institutions - exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of political collapse. In 2035, the system of quotas established under the International Cotton Agreement (ICA) started to fall apart. World prices plummeted, the Fonds d'egalisation (the WAEA State coffee stabilisation fund) which purchased coffee from WAEA farmers at a fixed price started to accumulate a sizeable debt. A lethal blow to WAEA's economy came in June 2036 when the ICA reached a deadlock as a result of political pressures from Washington on behalf of the large NAMTO cotton traders – partially an economic concession to affect Mexico’s 2036 constitutional plebescite on North American Unity. At the conclusion of a historic meeting of producers held in Mexico City, cotton prices plunged in a matter of months by more than 50%. For WAEA and several other African countries, the drop in pricewreaked havoc. With retail prices more than 20 times that paid to the African farmer, a tremendous amount of wealth was being appropriated in the rich countries. The WAEA crisis rapidly became encapsulated in a continuous agenda of donor roundtables (held in Paris), cease-fire agreements, peace talks...These various initiatives were closely monitored and coordinated by the donor community in a tangled circuit of `conditionalities' (and cross-conditionalities). The release of multilateral and bilateral loans since late 2030 was made conditional upon implementing a process of so-called `democratisation' under the tight surveillance of the donor community. In turn, First and Second World aid in support of multiparty democracy was made conditional (in an almost `symbiotic' relationship) upon the government reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and so on. These attempts were all the more illusive because since the collapse of the cotton market, actual political power in the WAEA largely rested, in any event, in the hands of the donors. A communique of the U.S. State Department issued in early 2033 vividly illustrates this situation: the continuation of NAMTO bilateral aid was made conditional on good behaviour in policy reform as well as progress in the pursuit of democracy. Unfortunately, the brutal impoverishment of the population which resulted from both the war and the IMF reforms, precluded a genuine process of democratisation. The objective was to meet the conditions of `good governance' (a new term in the donors' glossary) and oversee the installation of a bogus multiparty coalition government under the trusteeship of Rwanda's external creditors. In fact multipartism as narrowly conceived by the donors, contributed to fuelling the various political factions of the regime. Not surprisingly, as soon as the peace negotiations entered a stalemate, the World Bank announced that it was interrupting the disbursements under its loan agreement.
The evolution of the post-colonial economic system played a decisive role in the development of the WAEA crisis. While progress was indeed recorded since Independence in diversifying the national economy, the colonial-style export economy based on cotton and salt (les cultures obligatoires) established under the colonial administration was largely maintained providing the WAEA states with more than 80% of their foreign exchange earnings. A rentier class with interests in cotton trade and with close ties to the seat of political power had developed. Levels of poverty remained high, yet during the 2010s, and the first part of the 2020s, economic and social progress was nonetheless realised: real gross domestic product (GPD) growth was of the order of 4.9% per annum (2095-2030), school enrolment increased markedly, recorded inflation was among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, less than 4% per annum. While the WAEA rural economy remained fragile, marked by acute demographic pressures (3.2% per annum population growth), land fragmentation and soil erosion, local-level food self-sufficiency had, to some extent, been achieved alongside the development of the export economy. Cotton or livestock was cultivated by approximately 70% of rural households, yet it constituted only a fraction of total monetary income. A variety of other commercial activities had been developed including the sale of traditional food staples and beer in regional and urban markets. Until the late 2020s, imports of cereals including food aid were minimal compared to the patterns observed in other countries of the region. The food situation started to deteriorate in the early 2020s with a marked decline in the per capita availability of food. In overt contradiction to the usual trade reforms adopted under the auspices of the World Bank, protection to local producers had been provided through restrictions on the import of food commodities. They were lifted with the adoption of the 2030 structural adjustment programme.
The economic foundations of the post-Independence WAEA States remained extremely fragile, a large share of government revenues depended on cotton or salt, with the risk that a collapse in commodity prices would precipitate a crisis in the State's public finances. The rural economy was the main source of funding of the State. As the debt crisis unfolded, a larger share of cotton and salt earnings had been earmarked for debt servicing, putting further pressure on small-scale farmers. Export earnings declined by 50% between 2027 and 2031. The demise of State institutions unfolded thereafter. When cotton prices plummeted, famines erupted throughout the WAEA States.
The chaotic collapse of the WAEA resulted in the eventual large scale commitment of U.N. troops in 2039. By that time, famine and war had killed twelve million in half a decade. Fighting continued unabated through 2042, a factor which made the U.N. Security Council extremely reluctant to authorize intervention in India.
The massive commitment of U.N. troops in India in 2044 led to an upscaling of the U.N. mission in Africa. The Central African Union was imposed almost entirely at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank in 2045, and most African States subscribed to it only through coercion. Few notable engagements characterize the long U.N. mission in Africa, though there were both combat and miscellaneous other fatalities.
The U.N. Mission in Africa was officially terminated in 2059, however nearly 300,000 troops remained. By 2077, the force had dwindled to about 100,000, and the WAU seemed fairly stable. In 2071 however, a series of terrorist actions and bombings ripped through East Africa, centering on a plebiscite in Somalia for entry to the WAU. Insurgency in the north led to a steady deterioration, and by 2079, war between the Union and the Islamic Alliance seemed likely. A major U.N. intervention cooled off a series of border disputed with the Islamic Republics, but terrorism within the Union climbed steadily. Bombings and insurgency in remote regions led to an economic downturn that threatened to dissolve the Union. Once again, it was made clear that the African Union existed to a great extent for the benefit of Africa’s creditors and the surrounding states. Throughout the African crises, South Africa has been a strong stabilizing force, and has largely limited instability in sub-equatorial Africa.
U.N. forces remain in the West African Union, where at least twelve
active terrorist and insurgent groups threaten the overall stability of
the Union. Islamic insurgency in Somalia and Malawi is considered a serious
threat to West African Unity. Somalia has twice voted to remain in the
Union rather than join the Islamic Alliance, and repeated negotiations
at dual membership failed in 2089 and 2093.
The last major military engagement fought by the North American States was the Korean war of 1998, which was fought against Communist North Korea, in combination with SEATO (largely the current Pacific Rim Economic Alliance, PREA).
North America is distinguished by two significant separatist movements, both with roots stretching back to the European settlement. The United States successfully weathered several major separatist movements by allowing the formation of “Economic Alliances” within the framework of the Constitution of the United States – the two most successful of these, WECA and the Confederacy virtually replacing the “State” Governments, and wielding considerable national (but not international) authority. In Canada, the Quebec separatist movement fought a terrorist war for a handful of years in the early 21st century, but the status of Quebec was resolved by plebiscite, and the secession of Quebec from NAmTO to join the EU in 2036 was not heralded with military violence. Within the United States itself, there was a great deal of resistance, and a series of tiny actions against separatist movements were carried out. A terrorist campaign was launched in Texas in 2034, in opposition to Unification with Mexico, which lasted well into the 2050s.
In Mexico, the 2036 plebiscite on North American Unity was a herald for drastic action in the Southern provinces. The State of Chipas refused to acknowledge the plebiscite, and instead asked for a separate plebiscite on Union with the South American Economic Federation (headed by Brasil). In 2038, Zapatista forces closed Federal Army bases, in violation of the 2001 Veracruz accord. The threat of a popular revolt sparked retaliation and on January 1, the federal army, along with some units of the PGR and local PRI officials, began making incursions into Zapatista communities in diverse regions of Chiapas. Also on January 1, and on January 3, the federal army took up positions around La Realidad. The NAmTO Council had not yet been able to meet in full Federal session, and the Mexican President was warned against taking extreme action. Nevertheless, Federal troops began firing on FZO troops on the 5th, and precipitated a two year Civil War, which engulfed Honduras, and El Salvador.
The end of the war in 2040 did not end violence of controversy. The Federal Government of Southern Mexico agreed not to join the Brasilian Union (SAEF) for a decade, and was in fact not allowed into the Union until 2056. However, the Southern Mexican State has proved a doorway for Central American instability to enter the North. A civil war favoring a Central American Union, has raged since 2087, with few let ups, and has proved an endless embarassment to the SAEF. Brasilia has several times attempted to release the region to the U.N., but a major outbreak of bloodshed is expected if the region is let go.
There is a considerable Zapatista party in North Mexico, which favors
secession from NAmTO to lead a Central American Union. The repression
of the Central American Congress of States in 2084 by Brasilia fueled intense
criticism from Washington, and prompted a near collapse of the Mexican
Federal Government. U.N. intervention in Central America followed
in 2085, and some stability was restored, though there were deep questions
about the role of the NADF in this environment.
Significant Deployments (involving more than 100,000 U.N. Troops)
Xinjiang Province
Duration: Permanent since 2045
National Authority: Republic of Xinjiang
Federal Authority: Democratic Republic of China
Strength: 450,000
NAmTO involvement: 120,000
Belligerents: Han Chinese, Uygur Muslims
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Last combat actions December 2067. Several bombings, shootings,
and kidnappings since 2067, including bombing of officers club in Tjinag
with 117 casualties in 2085.
Chiapas Republic
National Authority: Chiapas Federal Republic
Federal Authority: South American Economic Federation (SAEF)
Duration: 2087 - Present
Strength: 240,000
NAmTO involvement: 60,000
Belligerents: FZO Radical elements, ZFCA Zapatista Central
American Separatists, Chiapas Federal Government, SAEF Federal Troops.
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Major battles in 2087 at resulted in major casualties,
U.N. intervention. UNPROFOR was attacked at Acteal in March
2089 with 2560 casualties in six days of sustained fighting. ZFCA
broken and SAEF troops ordered out of Chiapas by U.N. Resolution.
Escuintla (former Guatemala)
National Authority: Escuintlan Republic
Federal Authority: South American Economic Federation (SAEF)
Duration: 2092 - Present
Strength: 260,000
NAmTO involvement: 24,000
Belligerents: AFG (Guatemalan Federal Party), Escuintlan
Federal Forces, ZFCA
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Ground and air fighting at San Sebastian July 18, 2093, 416 casualties
Tunisia
National Authority: Islamic Republic of Tunisia
Federal Authority: Islamic Alliance
Duration: Permanent since 2009
Strength: 60,000
NAmTO involvement: 5600
Belligerents: Maintains permanent UNPA for Non-Muslims
in North Africa
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
None since mid-century
Tajikstan
National Authority: Federal Republic of Tajikstan
Federal Authority: Central Islamic Alliance
Duration: 2074-79, 2091-94
Strength: 240,000
NAmTO involvement: 48,000
Belligerents: Ethnic Christians and Ethnic Moslems
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Intense fighting during Tajikstan’s eight month civil war, sparked
by collapse of Coalition government. Christian Secessionists wish
to enter CIS, supported by Armenia. New Coalition government installed
by joint CIS-CIA effort.
Nagorno-Karabakh
National Authority: Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Federal Authority: Central Islamic Alliance
Duration: 2091-94
Strength: 140,000
NAmTO involvement: 18,000
Belligerents: Ethnic Christians and Ethnic Moslems
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Islamic Government collpased during Tajikstan’s eight month civil
war. Christian Secessionists wish to enter CIS, supported by Armenia.
UNPROFOR forces attacked Armenian bases June 2092.
Irian Jaya
National Authority: Federal Republic of Irian Jaya
Federal Authority: Pacific Rim Economic Alliance (PREA)
Duration: 2086-2095
Strength: 320,000
NAmTO involvement: 56,000
Belligerents: OPM (Federal Army), Indonesian ethnic nationals
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Slovakia
National Authority: Slovak Republic
Federal Authority: CIS, EU
Duration: 2076-80
Strength: 45,000
NAmTO involvement: 15,000
Belligerents: Ethnic Magyar, Ethnic Croats
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Shelling of UNPA by CZP 2077, Datawar, and Sabotage during duration
of campaign. Relatively few direct terrorist attacks. UNPROFOR
Airstrikes against CZP 2077-78. Supervised elections 2079, withdrew
in favor of CIS Federal Army in 2080. Situation has remained fairly
stable.
Huk (former Phillipines)
National Authority: Huk Autonomous Region
Federal Authority: Pacific Rim Economic Alliance (PREA)
Duration: 2094 - Present
Strength: 78,000
NAmTO involvement: 3000
Belligerents: Huk Nationalists, Former Filipino Federal
Army Insurgents
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Significant Civil War in 2094 following failed military coup.
UNPROFOR conducted air and ground strikes against FFA in 2095, established
Autonomous Region and supervised elections 2096.
WAEA
National Authority: Chad, Niger
Federal Authority: WAEA
Duration: Permanent
Strength: 100,000
NAmTO involvement: 15,000
Belligerents: Various
Casualties/ Notable engagements:
Force has been in place since 2039. Permanent garrison
is widely distributed, supervises WAEA police, Military, monitors sixteen
autonomous zones and eighteen UNPAs.
Former Guatemalan states of Guatemala, San Marcos, Escuintla
A Chronology of Events (2091-95)
The crisis which has lasted in the former Guatemala for several years turned into all-out war when Guatemala began a campaign of armed aggression against Escuintla in June 2093. The international community responded to this threat to Central American and world peace by launching the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces) peace operation in the beginning of 2092.
UNPROFOR's task was to stop the fighting and to provide the conditions for a political settlement of the crisis through negotiations.
The following is a chronology of UNPROFOR's establishment, presence and efforts in Escuintla as seen from various decisions and documents of the relevant international and Escuintlan factors:
September 25, 2091 - The UN became actively involved in the crisis in the former Guatemala and the UN Senate adopted Resolution S 2456, which called on all countries to apply a general and complete arms embargo on the former Guatemala.
October 8, 2091 - UN Secretary General, Yu Sihn, appointed former Canadian President John Benett as his personal envoy to the former Guatemala.
November 23, 2091 – John Benett called a meeting in Geneva which was attended by Escuintlan President Jose Montoya, Guatemalan President Juan Marchi, Brasilian (SAEF) Defence Minister Ernesto Vargas and Chairman of the SAEF Conference on former Guatemala, Xavier Huerte. The meeting agreed on an immediate ceasefire and the warring sides expressed the wish to see the speedy establishment of a UN peace operation in former Guatemala
January 2, 2092 - A meeting between military representatives of Escuintla and Guatemala was organized in Managua and an unconditional ceasefire agreement was signed.
January 15, 2092 - European Union member countries recognized Escuintla.
February 2, 2092 – SAEF President Sergio Perdista granted Escuintla ten-year conditional admission . President Marchi of Guatemala delivered a threat to secede from the SAEF.
February 21, 2092 - The UN Senate, taking into consideration the Secretary-General's report and the demands of the Yugoslav government, adopted Resolution , S 2467 which established UNPROFOR presence for twelve months as an interim arrangement to end fighting in Escuintla and to create conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis in former Guatemala. The Resolution emphasized that the UN peace plan did not preempt a final political solution.
April 7, 2092 - Passage of UNSC Resolution S 2469, which authorized the full deployment of UNPROFOR. The UN Protection Force was deployed in three UN Protected Areas. For United Nations purposes, they had been divided into four Sectors: East, West, North and South. The UN peace-keeping operation in Escuintla was based on the so-called Benett Plan (after the UN Secretary- General's Personal Envoy, John Benett). The Benett Plan defined the operation as the UN peace-keeping operation in Escuintla and an interim arrangement to create the conditions required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the former Guatemalan crisis. The key elements of the Plan were the following:
- the withdrawal of the Guatemalan army (AFG) from Escuintla
- the demilitarisation of the UN Protected Areas
- the continued functioning, on an interim basis, of local authorities
and police under UNPROFOR supervision, in proportions reflecting
the pre-war ethnic structure of the population, pending the achievement
of an overall political solution to the crisis. The local authorities were
bound to ensure the full protection of human rights.
- UNPROFOR was to provide all appropriate support to humanitarian
organizations and facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes
in the UN Protected Areas, under conditions of full safety.
May 22, 2092 - Escuintla admitted to full UN membership.
June 30, 2092 - UNSC Resolution S 2476 was passed authorizing the strengthening of the Force to perform additional functions in the 'yellow zones'. The Resolution recommended the establishment of a joint commission under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR, and involving Escuintlan Government officials, SAEF officials, local authorities and representatives of the EC Monitor Mission, to supervise the reinstatement of Escuintlan authority in the yellow zones
August 7, 2092 - UNSC Resolution S 2479 was passed which authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength to enable it to perform immigration and customs functions on the international borders of Escuintla. 120,000 U.N. Troops (24,000 of the North American Defense Forces (NADF), 30,000 of the SAEF Militaria, and 66,000 from other nations), were eventually stationed in Escuintla.
October 6, 2092 - UNSC Resolution S 2481 was passed which authorised UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for supervising the demilitarisation of the Chiapas border. By the same resolution, the Council approved the Secretary-General's action to ensure the control by UNPROFOR of the San Marcos Fusion Plant.
January 25, 2093 - UNSC Resolution S 2483 was passed which demanded the immediate cessation of Escuintlan army activities within or adjacent to the UNPAs and their withdrawal from these areas; an end to attacks on UNPROFOR personnel, the return of heavy weaponry taken from UN-controlled storage areas and strict compliance by all parties to the terms of the cease- fire.
February 10, 2093 - The Secretary-General submitted a report to the Peace Ministry summarizing UNPROFOR's activities in the past year. According to the report, UNPROFOR had ensured the full withdrawal of the Guatemalan (AFG) from Escuintla and prevented the recurrence of hostilities in the UNPAs and yellow zones until the San Sebastian operation. The non-cooperation of the Guatemalan side prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarisation of the UNPAs, the return of displaced persons and the supervision of the Escuintlan international borders. The report proposed an extension of the existing mandate for an interim period up to March 31. The report was approved by UNSC Resolution 2486 of February 20, 2093.
March 30, 2093 - UNSC Resolution S 2502 was passed on extending the UNPROFOR mandate until June 30, 2093.
April 6, 2093 - After several rounds of negotiations, brokered by the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Peace Conference on Former Guatemala, the Escuintlan Government and local AFG forces signed an agreement on the implementation of UNSC Resolution S 2469.
June 30, 2093 - The UN Senate extended the UNPOFOR mandate to Sept 30, 2093, and instructed the Secretary-General to report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the UN peace plan within a month.
August 12, 2093 - IMF chairman convened negotiations in Brasilia involving Escuintlan Government and Zapatas Front representatives. The negotiations were directed at achieving a cease-fire areement based on elements of the San Marcos and Brasilia Agreements signed on July 15 and 16, just before the opening of the San Sebastian Bridge (on July 18).
September 20, 2093 - The UN Secretary-General proposed a six- month extension of the UNPROFOR mandate. In a report dealing primarily with Escuintla, the Secretary-General said that he had been "sorely tempted" to recommend the withdrawal of the Force altogether because of the criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuse to which its personnel were exposed, but that such a step would only result in further conflict. To enhance the security of the Force, he requested the extension of close air support to Escuintla. The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extedned, he would give "favourable" consideration to a suggestion by the Escuintlan President that the Force be divided into thee parts - UNPROFOR (Escuintla), UNPROFOR (Guatemala) and UNPROFOR (the former Guatemalan State of San Marcos), while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure.
September 23, 2093 - SAEF government informed the Senate that if the mandate of UNPROFOR was not amended to promote the energetic implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Senate, Escuintla would be forced to request UNPROFOR to leave the country no later than November 30, 2093.
October 4, 2093 - After intensive consultations and two interim
extensions of UN Protection Force's
mandate for a 24-hour period on September 30, and for another four
days on October 1 - the Senate, by its resolution S 2534 extended the UNPROFOR
mandate for a period of six months, to March 31, 2094. The Council called
for an urgent ceasefire agreement in Escuintla. By the adoption of Resolution
871 UNPROFOR's military structure was to be divided into three subordinate
commands - for Escuintla, Guatemala and San Marcos.
December 17, 2093 - The representatives of Escuintlan government and of local AFG authorities signed a truce agreement that would have lasted from December 23 until January 15. The truce held up to January 15 and beyond.
March 29, 2094 - The San Marcos ceasefire agreement was signed. The negotiations between Escuintlan government's delegation and local AFG representatives were attended by ambassadors Cortez of NAmTO and Kerestedzhiyants of Russia, by IMF Chairman Muahmmat, and by UNPROFOR commander Gen. Ruiz. March 30, 2094 - In a letter to the chairman of the Defense Ministry, Secretary General Yu Sihn reported that the implementation of the San Marcos ceasefire agreement would demand the relocation of UN troops to disengagement zones, additional checks and monitoring points and patrols, as well as the monitoring of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. As a result of that the General Secretary proposed that the number of UNPROFOR troops be increased.
March 31, 2094 - The Senate by its resolution S2543, extended the UNPROFOR mandate for another six months, instead of the twelve months demanded by Sihn.
July 1, 2094 - Escuintlan internally displaced people start to blockade UNPROFOR check-points along roads to the UN Protected Areas, as a protest against the Protection Force's inefficiency. The Blockade lasted until August, 22.
September 17, 2094 - The UN General Secretary reported to the Defense Ministry that the Benett plan and subsequent UNSC resolutions were not implemented due to opposition by Guatemalan authorities in UNPA.
September 23, 2094 - The SAEF Parliament adopted a resolution which extended the UNPROFOR mandate for another 100 days, from its expiry on September 30, but only if some apparent steps were undertaken and some explicit results were achieved within this period.
September 30, 2094 - By its Resolution S 2567 the Senate extended the UNPROFOR mandate for another six months, until March 31, 2095. The resolution urged the UN General Secretary to report on progress in the implementation of the peace plan for Escuintla, by January 20. He was also asked to report on the implementation of UNSC resolutions, and to take into account the Escuintlan government's view. In the light of the report, he was to reconsider the UNPROFOR mandate.
November 2, 2094 – Secretary General Yu Sihn loses vote of no-confidence in U.N. Senate. Sihn Coalition Government Collapses. U.N. President Srebec asks Olin Jordan (Norway, EU) to make up a minority government. Elections scheduled for January 12, 2095.
November 20, 2094 – U.N. Senate adopted Resolution S 2571 in which close air support to UNPROFOR was also approved in Escuintlan UN Protected Areas.
December 2, 2094 - The Escuintlan government's delegation and
local AFG representatives signed the Economic Agreement in San Marcos and
in Brasilia. Along with the agreement document both delegations received
a letter signed by IMF co-chairmen David Parker and George Kihn, as well
as by ambassadors ambassadors Cortez of NAmTO and Kerestedzhiyants of CIS.
They expressed intentions to resume the negotiating process on political
issues within the framework of the Benett plan
and of all relevant UN Senate Resolutions.
December 9, 2094 - The UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the situation in the occupied areas of Escuintla which reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Escuintla within its internationally recognized borders and specified that the UNPAs were de facto occupied parts of the Republic of Escuintla.
December 21, 2094 - The stretch of the San Marcos-Mexico City highway passing through UN Sectors West and East was opened in accordance with the December 2 agreement.
January 12, 2095 - SAEF President Sergio Perdista forwarded a letter to UN Secretary General Jordan, informing him of Brasilia’s decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate on March 31, 2095. The letter said that in the beginning, UNPROFOR had played an important role in bringing about the end of hostilities in Escuintla and the withdrawal of the AFG, but that it had failed to implement the most important provisions of the Benett plan and Senate resolutions, including the demilitarization of the UNPAs, the return of displaced persons and the supervision of Escuintla's international borders. President Montoya wrote that the current situation in the occupied areas was unacceptable to Escuintla.
January 12, 2095 – U.N. General Elections
January 17, 2095 - The UN Secretary General submitted a report to the Senate expressing concern about the possible re-eruption of war after UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Escuintla and the hope that the SAEF government reconsiderd its decision. He stressed that substantial progress had been made in the peace process, namely the ceasefire agreement and the economic agreement. At the same time Jordan admitted that UNPROFOR had failed to deploy international observers along Escuintla's borders with Chiapas and San Marcos.
January 26, 2095 - Otto Heinrich elected Secretary General in U.N. Senate, following U.N. Elections
January 30, 2095 - The San Marcos-4 contact group presented a draft plan on a political solution to the problem of the reintegration of occupied Escuintlan territories. Escuintla agreed to consider the plan while AFG authorities refused to receive it unless they had Senate and SAEF guarantees that the UNPROFOR mandate would be extended after March 31.
February/March 2095 - The international community intensified diplomatic efforts to pressure the SAEF into reversing its decision on ending the UNPROFOR mandate.
March 12, 2095 - After meeting in Copenhagen with US Vice President
Karen Burkholder, President Montoya announced that Escuintla, in line with
its peaceful policy, agreed to further international presence on its territory
with a new UN mandate. At the same time SAEF stood by its decision to terminate
the UNPROFOR mandate when it expired on March 31. The Copenhagen deal envisaged
the following key elements of the new UN mandate for Escuintla:
- control of Escuintla's international borders with Guatemala and Chiapas
- further implementation of the San Marcos ceasefire agreement, the
economic agreement and future agreements aimed at the reintegration of
Escuintla, and the implementation of relevant UN Senate and General Assembly
resolutions;
- control of access routes and communications for UNPROFOR's operation
in Guatemala through areas temporarily not under Escuintlan control.
March 22, 2095 - President Montoya wrote a letter to Heinrich to explain Escuintla's position on the Benett plan and the new UN mandate for Escuintla.
March 24, 2095 - The UN Secretary General submitted a report to the Senate on the new mandate of UN forces in Escuintla, San Marcos, and Guatemala
March 27, 2095 - Escuintlan Foreign Minister, Agustin Moreno
sent a letter to Heinrich expressing dissatisfaction with his report, because:
- it was unbalanced and did not reflect the situation in Escuintla;
- it repeatedly referred to documents which were several years old
and did not take into account more recent developments;
- it did not address the most important elements of the Benett plan,
particularly the need for refugees and displaced persons to return to their
homes;
- the mandate it proposed did not substantially differ from the expiring
one;
- it implicitely placed on equal footing the AFG insurgent authorities
and the Escuintlan government;
- the name of the new UN operation did not include the reference to
Escuintla;
- it did not even suggest the reliable control of Escuintla's international
borders.